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IN THE SUPPE}.1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-v-
F.DWARD HOUSER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. CR 81-558 
BRIEF OF APPELLPu~T 
STATEMENT OF THE ~ATURE OF THE CASE 
Edward Houser appeals from a conviction and judgment 
of Theft by Receiving, a Felony of the Second De8ree, 
and of Carrying a Concealed and Dangerous Wea~on, a Pelony of 
the Third Dep,ree, in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. 
Dee, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITIO~ IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Edward Houser, was charged with Theft by 
Receiving, a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §76-6-408 (1953 as amended), and wit1i. Carrying 
a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Felony of the Third Degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-10-504 (1953 as amended). 
He was convicted of both charges in a jury trial and was sub-
sequently sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison 
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for the indeterminate concurrent terms of 1 to 15 vears and 
0 to 5 years respectively. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and 
judgment rendered below ans asks to have the case remanded 
to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial or to 
have the judgment vacated and a judgment of acquittal entered. 
STATE:MENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 14, 1980, a burglary occurred at the 
home of Dr. and Mrs. Broadbent sometime between the hours of 
noon and 4:00 p.m. When they returned horn from church, they 
found a number of items missing from their home and their house 
in a shambles. (15 T. at 54-56) 1 The missing ite~s included 
jewelry, a watch, a pen set, birth certificates, clinic cards, 
and a check from a tenant made out to Dr. Broadbent. (15 T. at 
61-71). It was stipulated by the parties that the amount of 
the items was greater than $1,000. (20 T. at 2). The Broadbents 
also found two spent bullets in their home. (15 T. at 57). 
On January 1, 1981 Mr. Houser was arrested bv Officer 
1. All references to the trial transcript from July 15 
1981 will be designated as "15 T."; references to the ' 
~ransc~ipt from July 16, 1981 will be desi?,nated at 
16 T. ; and all references to the transcriot 
from July 20, 1981 will be designated as "20 T." 
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DeWitt. This arrest was the subject of a motion to suppress mid-
trial. During the course of that motion, Officer DeWitt was the 
only witness. He testified that he saw Mr. Houser about 4:00 
p.m. on January 1, 1981, walking in an area near 717 South 200 
East with some type of handcart for moving furniture. (15 T. at 82). 
At this point, the officer observed no lettering on the handcart. 
(15 T. at 88). The officer watched Mr. Houser olace this handcart 
into his stationwagon and then proceeded to stop Mr. Houser and 
question him (15 T. at 84). He testified that he had four rea-
sons for doing so. One ":'1as that he knew that Mr. Houser had a 
prior record, although he was unaware of what Mr. Houser had 
been arrested for, either at that time or at the time of the 
trial. (15 T. at 83-84; 96; 102-105). The second reason was that 
he had been at this same address about a week earlier in the 
course of an eviction of Mr. Rouser's sister, and therefore, he 
believed that Mr. Houser no longer lived at that address. 
2 
(15 T. at 83; 88~ . The officer's third reason was that he 
believed that he had seen most of Mr. Rouser's belongings a week 
earlier and did not believe that Mr. Houser owned a handcart. 
(15 T. at 90; 95-96). The officer further testified that there 
was very little pedestrian traffic in the area at the time. (15 T 
at 95). He subsequently added that the landlord had asked him to 
2. 13ut see (15 T. at 102) where the officer states that he did not 
know if defendant had moved out as yet. 
-3-
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arrest anybody who came back to that address after the eviction. 
(15 T. at 98). 
After stopping Mr. Houser, Officer DeWitt asked Officer 
Cahoon to take a look at the handcart in the stationwa~on. 
(15 T. at 85; 92-93; 96-97)~ Without opening the door to the 
stationwagon, Officer Cahoon looked in and told Officer DeWitt 
that the handcart said "Stokes Brothers" on it. (15 T. at 96;106). 
Officer DeWitt subsequently told Officer Cahoon to bring the 
cart to him. (15 T. at 94;96). No contact was made with Stokes 
Brothers at this time and the officers had no reports of either 
a theft or a burglary. (15 T. at 86; 88-89; 94-95). There were 
no questions and no conversation about what Mr. Houser was doing 
in the neighborhood. (15 T. at 91-92; 100-101). 
Mr. Houser was then arrested by Officer DeWitt. A 
backpackin Mr. Rouser's possession was searched, yieldin~ some 
of the items from the Broadbents' home and a revolver. (15 T. at 76). 
The officer testified that he could not feel the revolver through 
the exterior of the pack. (15 T. at 76). At a later date, 
Mr. Houser ac-.companied another officer, Officer Gillies, back 
to the premises where he was arrested. At that time, a pen set 
of the Broadbents'was recovered from the premises. (16 T. at 32; 
92). Mr. Houser also located other items from the Broadbent's home 
and gave them voluntarily to the police. (16 T. at 47; 63). 
The rest of the testimony at trial came from Mr. Houser 
and some statements that Mr. Houser made to nfficer ~illies when 
interviewed by the officer on ·January 5, 1981. The evidence 
-l~-
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was that, on ~ecember 14, 1980, Mr. Houser was at the address of 
717 South 200 East. The Defendant had returned to these premises 
to board up the place because it had been burglarized a dav or 
two before. (16 T. at 68-69; 106-109). Two people came over, 
a man and a woman, subsequently identified as Ralph Schimerald 
and Lynette Gillman. (16 T. at 24; 28; 67-69; 109). They arrived 
somewhere between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. with various items that the 
defendant subsequently identified as being from the Broadbents. 
(16 T. at 25-26; 72). Mr. Schimerald was injured by a gunshot 
and was brought into the house by Mr. Houser and Ms. Gillman. 
(16 T. at 41-42; 70; 110). Mr. Schimerald ,refused to go to 
the hospital at Mr. Rouser's suggestion. (16 T. at 41-42; 71). 
Ms. Gillman asked Mr. Houser to help her sort the jewelry items 
into precious metals and non-precious metals. This Mr. Houser 
refused to do. (16 T. at 73). However, he did take Ms. Gillman 
and show her two places where she could later take the items 
to find outwhichwere precious metals. (16 T. at 27; 7L~-75; 113). 
He did not help her sell them in any way and in fact refused 
to acc~pt any items that were offerred to him. (16 T. at 76-77). 
Mr. Houser did tell Officer Gillies, however, that he knew those 
items were stolen. (16 T. at 24; 29). In fact, Mr. Schimerald 
and Ms. Gillman had told him that Mr. Schimerald had just shot 
himself in the course of a burglary. (16 T. at 70; 73). 
On December 17, 1980 Mr. Houser r"1ent back to 717 South 
200 East. At that time niether Mr. Schimerald nor Ms. Gillman 
were there. (16 T. at 77; 114). However, Mr. Houser observed 
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a sawed off shotgun in a closet crawl space at that residence. 
(16 T. at 114). He did not remove the shotgun at that time. 
He also returned around December 20 and again on December 31. 
On December 31, Mr. Houser observed that the sawed off shotgun 
was in the trunk of a 1969 Buick of his that was parked out 
in front of the residence. (20 T. at 24-25). Earlier that 
evening, he had seen Mr. Schimerald at a party and at that time 
discovered that these items belonged to a Dr. Broadbent. 
(16 T. at 79). Mr. Houser bought some of the items from Mr. 
Schimerald with the intent to return them to Dr. Broadbent. 
In particular he bought a wat~h that he thought would have 
sentimental value to the Broadbents. (16 T. at 81-83; 103). 
Mr. Houser, his girlfriend, and his daughter spent the night at 
717 South 200 East. At that time or the next day, Mr. Houser found 
a revolver outside of the window. (16 T. at 87; 121). Because 
the house had just been burglarized again a few days earlier, it 
was his belief that the revolver had been inadvertently dropped 
by the burglars. (15 T. at 23; 122). Mr. Houser picked up the 
revolver with · a· pen intending not to leave any fingerprints 
on it so that possibly the police could found out who had broken 
into the residence and taken his belongings. (16 T. at 40; 88). 
Early on January 1, 1981, Mr. Houser, his girlfriend, 
and his daughter decided to go to a local miniature mart to get 
something to eat. (16 T. at 89-90). Prior to that time Mr. 
Houser had placed the revolver in the center compartment of his 
-6-
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pack and the belongings of the Broadbents in another compartment 
of his pack. (16 T. at 90; 96; 122). Because the pack was heavy 
with many items, Mr. Houser did not at first realize that the re-
volver was in the pack when they started to the miniature mart. 
When he suddenly remembered the gun, he decided to leave it 
where it was. He said that he was afraid that, if he left it 
in the house, the burglars would come back looking for it. He 
was also worried that, if he took it out of his pack, he would 
be arrested and taken to jail for having a firearm in his 
hand on the street. Therefore, he decided to leave it in the 
pack while he went to the miniature mart. (16 T. at 90-91; 104). 
It was later that day that he was arrested and had those items 
in his pack. (16 T. at 92). 
Mr. Houser further testified that he did not wish to 
~o to the police initially with the items from the Broadbents 
because he wanted to return them to the Broadbents without 
any police involvement. He had previously testified in another 
burglary case for the state and, as a result of that testimony, 
he was harrassed, called a snitch, and vandalized. So this time 
he thought he could return the items without incurring that 
type of harrasment. (20 T. at 15-18). Mr. Houser agreed to 
testify against Ralph Schimerald and Lynette Gillman when he was 
asked to by the officers. (16 T. at 98; 130-131). However, he 
was never subpoenaed and never did so testify. (16 T. at 103) . 3 
3. Although Officer Gillies clai~ed he believed that Mr. Houser was 
subpoenaed, (16 T. 49), he later recanted his testimony. (16 T. at 
54). 
-7-
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Nevertheless, the officers did state that Mre Houser was co-
operative. It was through Mr. Houser that the officers were 
able to obtain the names of the two who had in fact burglarized 
the Broadbents and were able to regain much of the property 
that had been lost by the Broadbents. (16 T. at 36; 99-102; 
125-126; 20 T. at 21). 
vides: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
A 
' THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SUSPICION TO STOP 
A...~D DETAIN APPELLANT 
Utah Code Annotated ~77-7-15 (1953 as amended) oro-
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed ·or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit 
a public offense and may demand his name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
If such a person is properly detained, an officer has a further 
right to "frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is in dang.er." 
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-16 (1953 as amended). The offieer 
in this case satisfied niether of these statutes. 
Constitutional standards for a detention of a person 
not amounting to an arrest were outlined by the United States 
Suoreme Court in Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.C. 1868, 
20 L.Ed 2nd 889 (1968). In determinin?, the reasonableness of 
any such seizure and subsequent search' t''ho rn,,,....,.. ~+-"'.]+-~~ • Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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[In] justifying the particular intrusion 
the police officer trust be able to point 
to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together, with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonabl·" warrant that 
intrusion. Id- at 21. 
The Cou,...t f 11rt'her admonished that the "good faith" of rhe 
officer was not in and of itself sufficient. InsteRd, Rn 
~iestion in assessing this stop is: 
Would the facts available to the officer at 
the moment of the seizure or search "war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief" th.qt the af"tinn t.qke-n wa~ apnro-
pr4 ate? Td. at 22 
This type of. search cannot be based on "mere curiosity, rumor 
or -~~hunch." Ih Re: Tony C., 582 P.2d957, 959 (Cal. 1978). 
This Court has recognized that each fact situation 
must be analyzed ·on its 0~11m merits. In State v. Whittenback, 
61 P.2d 103 (Utah, 1980) this Court upheld a detention where 
the officer, knowing thefts had o("cu,...ren in rhe .qre::l ann 
th::lt dP.fendants had previously had contraband and a bag of coins, 
observed the defendants alone in a laundromat. The officers 
subsequently conducted a consent search of defendants' vehicle. 
More recently, this Court upheld a Terry stop in State v. 
Ballenburger, 652P.2d927 (Utah 1982). In that case, the officers 
saw the defendants near their car in an empty shopping area at 
3:00 a.rn. This Court held that the lateness of the hour, 
the suspicious activities of the defendants, the knowledge 
-9-
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of an increased rate of burglaries in the area, and the obser-
vation of radio equipment in defendants' car justified the stop. 
The reasons articulated by the officer in this 
case did not amount .to a reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was occurring. Officer DeWitt testified that he saw 
Appellant walking in an area near 717 South 200 Easto 
Appellant was anoarently pulling or pushing an empty 
handcart, which he put in his stationwagon. At this point, 
the Ofticer approached and detained Appellante Officer DeWitt's 
reasons for detaining Appellant were: 
A. He knew that Appellant had a prior record 
but he did not know the nature of that record 
or what Appellant had previously been arrested 
for; 
B. He knew Appellant's sister had been evicted 
from the residence at 717 South 200 East a week 
earlier and that Appellant no longer lived 
there; 
C. He believed that he had seen most of 
A~pellant's belongings previously and did not 
think Appellant o-vmed a handcart; 
D. There was very little pedestrian traffic 
in the area at the time; 
E. The landlord had asked him to arrest any-
one who came to the residence after the 
eviction. 
-10-
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These reasons, independently or collectively, fall short of 
com~rising specific and articulable facts and creating rational 
inferences which warrant a reasonable suspicion to justify 
detaining the Appellant. 
Appellant's prior record would have indicated nothing 
that would lead a reasonable officer to believe criminal 
activity was presently occurring. The police officer knew only 
that Appellant had some kind of prior record. He knew nothing 
more about it, not even what type -of offenses were on the 
record. The officer also had no information that a theft had 
occurred in the area. However, even if the officer had 
legitimately suspected a theft based on other information, he 
stated that he had · .. no.· knowledge that there were theft 
offenses on Appellant's record. There is thus no rational 
connection between stoppinP, Appellant and his record. 
The eviction of Anpellant's sister from a residence 
in the area or the officers belief as to the extent of 
Appellant's belongings similarly would not be a sufficient 
reason to detain him. The Officer said that he did not know 
if Appellant had moved his belongings out of the residence, so 
there was a logical explanation for his presence in the area 
other than criminal activity. Officer DeWitt further thought 
that he had seen all of Appellant's belongings on a prior occasion 
and did not think he o~med a handcart. This reason is patently 
-11-
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ridiculous and cannot substitute for specific facts or rational 
inferences. Appellant could have rented a cart, borrowed 
it, or found one abandoned. Regardless, he need not have owned 
it in order to have legitimately had possession of ita 
The fact that there was little pedestrian traffic 
in the area is also not a reasonable suspicion that Appellant 
was engaged in criminal activity. It was 4:00 p.rn. on New Year's 
Day on a residential street. This fact is not a basis for 
reasonable susicion of anything. Appellant was approaching his 
O'WI'l car, placing a handcart beside it. Appellant's mere 
presence in an area with few other people would not warrant a 
suspicion of criminal activity. 
Officer DeWitt further said that the landlord had 
told him to arrest anyone returning to the house. Of course,-
citizens cannot tell oolice officers who to arrest and when to 
make arrests. The police must have their o~m reasonable 
suspicions to detain anyone, and need orobable cause to make 
arrests, not permission from citizens. This was obviouslv not 
a major reason for the detention in any event, as the officer never 
even asked Appellant about his presence at the residence. 
There were thus no specific and articulable facts 
which would have caused the officer to reasonably suspect that 
some criminal activity was occurring or that appellant was 
involved that activity. Unlike the facts in State v. Whittenback, 
supra, or in Ballenbur~er, suora, the officer in this case had 
-12-
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no knowledge of prior thefts in the area or that Appellant 
in fact had contraband. Without these threshold facts , 
confiscation of the handcart from the car and the subsequent 
search of Appellant were impermissible. 
~ 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S 
VEHICLE WAS ILLEGAL 
The Officers conducted a search of Appellant's 
vehicle without a warrant after he was detained but before 
he was arrested. This search was the fruit of an illegal 
,_, 
detention. But even assuming a proper detention, this was 
not a search incident to arrest, nor is there evidence that it 
was a consent search. There was no stoo of a moving motor 
vehicle or o.f Appellant in the vehicle, so this was not a sit-
uation where exigent circumstances existed to search the car. 
The only faintly plausible exception to the warrant r·equirement 
is the plain_vi .. ew doctrine. 
The United States Supreme Court defined the plain view 
doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 
564, 91 S.C. 2022 (1971). In Coolidge, the Court held that 
plainviawcould not support the seizure of an automobile in 
defendant's driveway where the officers knew in advance they 
wanted to seize the car. The Court stated that the common thread 
of plain. vi.ew case "is that the police officer in each of them had 
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which 
he -Cc?me inadvertently upon a piece of evidence incriminating the accused" 
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and that " it is immediately apparent to the police that they have 
evidence before them." Ide at 466. Examples cited by the 
Court include contraband evidence discovered while in "hot 
pursuit" of a suspect or incident to an arrest on another matter. 
The limitations on plain view are intended to guarantee the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirements are not infringed upon. 
The Court in Coolidge stated two objectives of the warrant 
requirement: "to eliminate altogether searches not based on 
·probable cause" and "that those s_earches deemed necessary 
should be as limited as possible." Id. at 467., The requirement 
of inadvertence of discovery and an innnediately apparent 
incriminating nature of the evidence safeguard the Fourth 
Amendment guarantees, but at the same time allow police to 
perform their duties. 
The warrantless seizure of the cart in this case did 
not fall within the plainview exception. First, there was 
no legitimate reason for the officer to be in the area. Even 
assuming that the officer was legitimately there, however, 
the discovery of the cart by them was neither inadvertent n~r 
did it immediately appear to be incriminating. Officer DeWitt 
·-· 
saw no lettering on the cart himself. Instead, he instructed 
Officer Cahoon specifically to approach the vehicle and examine 
the cart. This was thus a calculated search, not an inadvertent 
discovery. Moreover, the handcart was not clearly incriminating. 
It did have the words "Stokes Brothers" orinted on it, but the 
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police had no information regarding a burglary or theft of a 
handcart from Stokes Brothers nor did they first verify if 
any such information existed. There were many legitimate 
explanations other than criminal activity to explain Appellant's 
possession of the handcart. There was, therefore, an illegal 
seizure of the handcart without a warrant. Because such illegally 
seized evidence cannot be used to establish the probable cause 
for an arrest, Appellant's subsequent arrest and search 
was improper. 
c. 
THERE WAS no PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
APPELLA.~T 
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-2 (1953 as amended) provides: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of a warrant or may, without, 
warrant, arrest a person: (1) for 
a. public offense committed or 
attempted in his presence; (2) when 
he has reasonable cause to believe 
a felonv has been committed and has 
reasonable cause to believe that 
the uerson arrested has coMMitted 
it; .(3) when he has reasonable cause 
to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reason-
able cause for believing a person may; 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid 
arrest; (b) destroy or conceal evidence 
of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage 
property belonging to another person. 
In State v. Whittenback, supra, this Court recognized· the 
standards set forth in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.C. 223, 
13 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1964),.and in an earlier Utah case for determining 
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probable cause for arrest: 
The determination should be made on an 
objective standard: whether from the 
facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in his position would be 
justified in believing that the sus-
pect had committed the offense. 
621 P.2 at 106, quoting from State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 
495 P.2d 1259 (1972). In Whittenback, where defendants were 
convicted of theft from a laundromat, the officer not only 
knew that thefts had been committed in the area, but also 
he had observed bulges in defendant's pockets and lock 
picks on the floor near defendants. 
In this case, the nolice had no facts in which 
to base a reasonable cause to believe that the Appellant 
had committed any thefts. The arrest occurred after the 
handcart was illegally seized. Although the ~ourt in Whittenback 
affirmed a search prior to the actual arrest, it was noted that 
the officer in fact had probable cause to arrest defendant prior 
to conducting the search. 621 P.2d at 106. In this case, no 
probable cause existed even after the discovery of the handcart. 
The Officer simply observed Appellant with what appeared to 
be an unmarked handcart which he placed inside his car. T~ile 
the officer knew that Appellant had a record, he did not know 
whether that included any theft charges. Further, although 
he did not think Appellant owned a handcart, there had been no 
reports of thefts in the area. Appellant's µresence in the area 
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and eviction matter were irrelevant to whether there was pro-
bable cause regarding a stolen handcart. Even assuming that 
the seizure of the handcart was legal, the mere fact that 
"Stokes Brothers" was on the handcart was not reasonable cause to 
assume that criminal activity in the absence of a renort of 
a theft or burglary. Appellant was arrested on a mere hunch 
by the officer. No rational inference that a crime had been 
committed, much less that Appellant had committed one, existed. 
This illegal arrest thus renders the subsequent search 
of the backpack inproper. 
D. 
SEARCH OF APPELL~NT'S BACKPACK WAS ILLEGAL 
Without a reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant, 
and without probable cause to search his car or to arrest 
him, the subsequent search of his back~ack was illegal. Con-
sequently, its contents should have been suppressed at the 
trial. These issues divide into two areas: (1) ~search 
incident to arrest and (2) a search pursuant to a Terry ston 
and frisk situation. 
The major issue is whether the trial court should have 
suppressed the contents of the backpack as a result of an illegal 
arrest. The United States Supreme Court in Mapn -V. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed~ 2d 1081, 81 S.C. 1684 (1961), set forth the 
rule that evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is not admissible in state courts. This rule 
has been most often utilized in the context of suppressing 
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confessions obtained after an illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U0 S. 590, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416, 95 SoC. 2254 (1975); Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 UoS. 471, 9 L.Edo 2d 441, 83 S.C~ 407 (1963) 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter constitutional 
0 • ~ . 
violations and, thus, to preserve judicial integrity. Brown 
v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 599-600. In this case, search 
of Appellant's backpack was the result of his arrest without 
probable cause for the theft of the handcarto The evidence 
gained from the search should, therefore, have been suppressed. 
Moreover, even if the sear.ch is perceived as being 
a result of the primary detention and not as the result 
of the arrest, it was improper. The authority to frisk for 
such circumstances is limited to a search "for a dangerous 
weapon" if [the officer] reasonably believes he or any 
other person is in danger'.' Utah Code Annotated § 77 - 7-16 
(1953 as amended). The Utah Statute is based on the United 
States Supreme Court holding in Terry v. Ohio, supra, 
which expressly limited such frisks to "that which is necessary 
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the 
officer or others nearby." 392 U.S. at 2. 
In this case, the officer soecifically said that 
he did not observe an object appearing to be gun through the 
exterior of the pack. There were no other reasons voiced by 
the officer that would justify any suspicion of weapons or 
danger to the officer. To the extent, the officer voiced any 
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suspicion, it was that Appellant had stolen the handcart. 
Where the contents of the backpack were discovered only as a 
result of Appellant's illegal detention and/or arrest, without 
suspicion of weapons, it should have been suppressed at trial. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
APPELLANT 
This Court has held that the evidence is insufficient 
to sustain a verdict where "the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly have reached 
a verdict bevond a reasonable doubt." State v. Larrnn, 606 J?.2d 
229, 231(Utah1980). Recently, this Court reversed a con-
viction in a theft case where the evidence was de minimis on 
the issue of unauthorized control of an alleP-edly stolen motor 
vehicle. State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3 (Utah ·1982). 
In this case, the evidence on criminal intent was 
de minimis. Our svstem of justice is based on culpability 
involving both an act and a mental state. Neither is sufficient 
by itself. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) provides 
that a theft by receiving occurswhen a person acts "with a pur-
pose to deprive the owner" of property. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504 
(1953 as amended) is a general intent crime, not stating what 
level of mental culpability is reouired. However, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-102 (1953 as amended) ~rovides that, where no mental 
state is specified, intent, knowledge, or recklessness is 
required. Thus, the State had to prove that Appellant acted at 
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least recklessly with respect to concealing the gun. 
The State failed to nresent evidence to prove 
A~pellant's intent beyond a reasonable doubto The victims 
testified to th~ fact that their home was burglarized. Appellant 
testified that he knew who had committed the burglary and theft; 
how he had obtained the items from he burglary; and why he 
had a pistol in his backpack. Appellant testified that he 
intended to return the items to the victims, but wanted 
to do so without being labeled a "snitch." Consequently, he 
had not called the police. Appellant also testified that he 
was unaware he had the gun in his pack until he was on a 
public street where he felt he could not withdraw it. There 
was no evidence to rebut his testimony. The State merely 
relied on Appellant's actions of possessing the items from the 
burglary and the gun. This does not rise to nroaf beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Appellant either intended to deprive the 
owners of this property or recklessly concealed a weaoon. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief, the A~pel­
lant seeks to have this Court either 1) reverse the trial 
court's ruling which denied the motion to suppress and order 
a new trial; or 2) reverse the judgment below on the basis 
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that the evidence was insufficient to convict on the 
offenses charged and order the entry of a judgment of 
acquittal. 
DATED this ~day of February, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
c~~/-
LINDA E. CARTER 
Attorney for Anoellant 
DELIVERED a.copy of the forep.oing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
1983. 
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